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Trademark and Advertising Issues
Posed by 1‐800’s Experts
• Does sale and use of trademarked terms in
keyword advertising alone constitute
infringement?
• Does empirical evidence suggest that consumers
experience trademark confusion when they see
rival ads generated by keyword advertising?
• Are the terms of the 1‐800’s settlement
agreements “commonplace” or remedies that
courts would order?
• Does sale and use of trademarked terms in
keyword advertising alone constitute dilution?
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Trademark Framework
• Shorthand facilitates comparison and
differentiation among similar products
• Trademark doctrine balances the public and
consumer interest in competition with the need
to avoid consumer confusion about who is
supplying a product
• Trademark law is concerned about a very specific
kind of consumer confusion – confusion as to:
– Source
– Sponsorship
– Affiliation
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Keyword Advertising Cases
• Case law consistently favors competitive
advertising – “free riding” is really competition
• Cases Mr. Hogan cites do not stand for the
proposition that keyword advertising alone is
infringement
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Keyword‐Only Cases
• Blue Nile – motion to dismiss denied because
parties were not direct competitors –
wholesaler vs. retailer
• FragranceNet – motion to dismiss related to
validity of Plaintiff’s marks, not to confusion
• LBF Travel – District Judge did not rule on
dismissal of keyword infringement claims
• Rhino Sports – no liability for broad‐matching;
defendant free to bid on generic terms
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Empirical Studies
• Studies show:
– Varied search goals
– Expectation of and appreciation for comparative
advertising

• The American Airlines studies ask the wrong
questions
• Confusion about whether a search result is
organic or sponsored is not trademark confusion
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Remedies
• No court has found liability based solely on
keyword bidding
• No cases support use of broad matching
prohibition or negative keyword requirement as a
trademark remedy
• No court has implemented reciprocal restraints
on bidding
• Hogan’s cited cases do not support finding of
“commonality”
• There is no way to say what settlement terms are
“common”
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Dilution
• Professor Goodstein’s conception of dilution is
not the legal definition
• Anti‐dilution statute includes an explicit exclusion
for comparative advertising like that at issue here

9
CCXD0007-009

PUBLIC

Source: 1‐800F_00045485.xls, cited in CX8014 (Tushnet Rebuttal Report).
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See First Amended Complaint at 25, Binder v. Disability Group, Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2011), cited in CX8014 (Tushnet Rebuttal Report).

“[Defendant] Disability Group, Inc. has purchased keywords
comprised, in whole or in part, of the BINDER & BINDER MARKS.
Disability Group, Inc. has used the BINDER & BINDER MARKS as a
heading to link to Defendant’s website.”
Id. ¶¶ 49‐50 (internal numbering omitted), cited in CX8014 (Tushnet
Rebuttal Report).
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See Soaring Helmet Corp. v. Nanal, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262 (W.D.
Wash. 2011), cited in CX8014 (Tushnet Rebuttal Report).

• “The majority of the remaining Sleekcraft factors also support
a finding that a consumer would be confused by Nanal’s use
of the term ‘vega helmets’ in its advertisements.”
Id. at *15, cited in CX8014 (Tushnet Rebuttal Report).
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Quotes from Cases
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“Needless to say, a defendant must do more than
use another’s mark in commerce to violate the
Lanham Act…. We have no idea whether
Rescuecom can prove that Google’s use of
Rescuecom’s trademark in its AdWords program
causes likelihood of confusion or mistake….
Whether Google’s actual practice is in fact benign
or confusing is not for us to judge at this time. We
consider at the 12(b)(6) stage only what is alleged
in the Complaint.”
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir.
2009)
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“[I]n the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 lines,
reasonable, prudent and experienced internet
consumers are accustomed to such exploration by trial
and error. They skip from site to site, ready to hit the
back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s
contents. They fully expect to find some sites that
aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the
domain name or search engine summary. Outside the
special case of … domains that actively claim affiliation
with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any
firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website
until they’ve seen the landing page — if then.”
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179
(9th Cir. 2010).
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“Perhaps in the abstract, one who searches for a
particular business with a strong mark and sees
an entry on the results page will naturally infer
that the entry is for that business. But that
inference is an unnatural one when the entry is
clearly labeled as an advertisement and clearly
identifies the source, which has a name quite
different from the business being searched for.”
1‐800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2013).
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“Because Amazon clearly labels each of the
products for sale by brand name and model
number accompanied by a photograph of the
item, it is unreasonable to suppose that the
reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to
shopping online would be confused about the
source of the goods.”
Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 938
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1231 (2016).
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“BPI points to no case indicating that the simple purchase of
advertising keywords, without more, may constitute initial
interest confusion. As noted, ‘[i]nitial interest confusion …
occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity
of the mark….’ Thus, the ‘luring’ becomes the critical element.
In situations such as the one presented here, the use of a
keyword encompassing a competitor’s terms does not
necessarily produce an infringing advertisement; it is the
content of the advertisement and/or the manner in which the
mark is used that creates initial interest confusion.
BPI’s premise logically culminates in the destruction of
common Internet advertising methods and unreasonably
encumbers generally accepted competitive practices.”
USA Nutraceuticals Grp., Inc. v. BPI Sports, LLC, 2016 WL 695596
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016).
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“The Hatfields used up to seven Web sites to sell
Products to the general public. The Web sites displayed
pictures and descriptions of Products and used
Plaintiffs’ trademarks. The Hatfields also used Plaintiffs’
trademarks in the metatags of their Web sites. Further,
Defendants paid a company called Overture.com for an
‘Overture Premium Listing’ for ‘Australian Gold’ and
‘Swedish Beauty,’ guaranteeing that one of Defendants’
Web sites would be among the first three listed if either
of Plaintiffs’ trademarks was used in an internet search
query.”
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir.
2006).
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“We conclude that the factors other than
evidence of actual confusion (even if we assume
that 1‐800’s mark is a strong one) firmly support
the unlikelihood of confusion. This case is readily
distinguishable from Australian Gold, in which
the alleged infringer used its competitor’s
trademarks on its websites.”
1‐800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2013).
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